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The Dakar conference on Namibia and 
human rights
1 . Procedural arrangements
The international conference on "Namibia and Human 
Rights" that took place in Dakar, Senegal on 5 to 
8 January 1976 was, to the best of my knowledge, 
the idea of dr Karel Vasak in his capacity as 
president of the International Institute of Human 
Rights of Strasbourg, France, who planned the 
conference - again to the best of my knowledge - 
in close collaboration with mr Seán MacBride, the 
United Nations Commissioner for Namibia. The 
Government of the Republic of Senegal acted as 
host for the conference, the conference was formal= 
ly sponsored by mr Seán MacBride, and it was 
officially organized by the International Institute 
of Human Rights. The International Commission of 
Jurists and the International Association of Democ= 
ratic Lawyers also lent their support to the organ= 
izers of the conference.
I attended the Dakar conference at the invitation 
of, and with financial assistance from, the Inter= 
national Institute of Human Rights; and being a 
former participant of the Institute's annual train= 
ing centre, Í maintained close contact at the con= 
ference with members of the Strasbourg office of 
the Institute who acted as secretariat to the con= 
ference. I found myself among the approximately 
300 participants at the conference in the category 
of so-called "individual experts", who had been 
invited to the conference presumably to strengthen 
the number of academic lawyers at the conference. 
The other categories of participants were classed 
as "deligates designated by governments and inter­
governmental organizations, national liberation 
movements and non-governmental organizations" and
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as "observers". Individual experts and observers 
could participate in all the activities of the 
conference on an equal footing with delegates of 
governments, inter-governmental organizations, 
national liberation movements and non-governmental 
organizations, but only the latter category of 
participants had the right to vote. I hasten to 
add that decisions based upon votes were avoided 
at the conference and that the resolutions of the 
conference were supposed to portray what was 
thought to be the general opinion of the partici= 
pants.
The purpose of the conference was said to be, 
firstly, to "throw light on the human rights situa= 
tion in Namibia and on the struggle for human 
rights in Namibia", and, secondly, to "lay the 
foundation for the liberation of Namibia in the 
spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights". Stripped of all traces of fanciful 
phrasing and in view of what actually took place 
in Dakar it is, I think, fair to state that the 
conference in effect represented a grotesque effort 
to sell Swapo to the world - notably the western 
and African countries - as the alleged only authen= 
tic representative of the people and as the indis= 
putable future government of South West Africa.
It may also have been the sincere wish of the 
organizers of the conference to sell human rights 
ideals and principles to Swapo but Swapo1s major, 
or perhaps sole, interests in the conference was 
presumably to acquire international support for its 
military activities on the borders of, and for its 
political aspirations within the territory. Swapo 
was obviously the guest of honour at the conference 
and from time to time its representatives were 
specifically asked by the chairman to indicate 
whether certain proposals made by speakers from the 
floor would meet with Swapo's approval.
The first day of the conference was dedicated to 
certain formal matters and to the presentation of 
a series of messages from important international 
bodies and various national governments. The 
speakers at this plenary session included represent= 
atives of the United Nations Special Committee 
against Apartheid, the Council for Namibia, the
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Commission on Human Rights, Unesco, various inter= 
national church organizations, including the World 
Council of Churches, and national governments such 
as those of Zambia and Senegal.
The conference was formally opened by the presi= 
dent of the Republic of Senegal, mr Leopold S 
Senghor. The opening session was - needless to 
say - also addressed by mr Sam Nujoma, the ^*.,si= 
dent of Swapo.
A message of dr Kurt Waldheim, secretary-general 
of the United Nations, was disseminated to the 
participants at the conference. Dr Waldheim him= 
self was not present. The United Nations was re= 
presented by its deputy secretary-general, mr 
Issoutou Djermakoye.
Dr Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, who was also scheduled 
to speak at the opening session informed the or= 
ganizers of the conference at the last momen-* that 
he could not attend. Also not present was dr Karel 
Vasak, the actual brain behind the conference. 
Speculations would have it that dr Kaunda's détente 
associations with South Africa's mr John Vorster 
had inspired his decision not to go to Dakar. It 
was common knowledge at the conference that dr 
Vasak's leave to travel to Africa had been cancel= 
led by the Council of Europe, of which dr Vasak is 
the secretary. It was believed that the Council 
feared that it may be embarrassed by the participa= 
tion of any of its officials at a conference which 
was potentially prone to breed or tu stimulate 
militant ideas.
As far as the procedural arrangements at the con= 
ference are concerned, the formalities proceeded 
as follows: On the second and third days of the 
conference the participants gathered simultaneous= 
ly in either of two commissions. The first com= 
mission was supposed to consider the past and pre= 
sent situation of South West Africa, while the 
second commission was constituted to give atten= 
tion to the present and future situation of the 
territory. Both commissions were called upon to 
draft prelimenary observations dealing with the 
relevant aspects of the problem, and on the final
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day of the conference the participants once again 
assembled in a plenary session for the purpose of 
approving the Dakar Declaration on Namibia and Human 
Rights and a Programme of Action proposed to interna= 
tional organizations, states, non-governmental or= 
ganizations and social, professional, trade-union 
and information organizations as a set of measures 
to be taken by such organizations to secure for 
the people of South West Africa the exercise of 
their right to self-determination.
For the record I may add that I attended the second 
Commission's sessions and that my travel arrange= 
ments forced me to miss the final plenary session.
2. Suppositions accepted by the conference
The Dakar conference accepted without question 
certain propositions, of which the following are 
of special interest and import:
2.1 The illegality of South Africa's Presence in 
South West Africa
The first proposition I have in mind was that 
South Africa's presence in South West Africa con= 
stitutes illegal occupation and a colonial type of 
administration of the territory. This attitude is 
in accordance with resolution 2145 (XXI) adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 
27 October 1966, whereby South Africa's administra= 
tion of South West Africa - which, incidentally, 
by virtue of GA Res 2372 (XXII) of 1968, became 
known in international law as Namibia - was out= 
lawes. The outlawing of South Africa's presence 
in South West Africa was endorsed by the Security 
Council of the United Nations in SC Res 264 of 1969 
and by the International Court of Justice in the 
Namibia case of 1971.
2.2 The Right of Self-Determination
The second proposition worth mentioning adopted by 
the Dakar conference proclaimed that the right of 
peoples to self-determination is an essential pre­
requisite for the implementation of hunian-rights
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principles.
This proposition is again in conformity with the 
sentiments entertained by the United Nations in 
the present regard. Article 1(2) of the UN Chart= 
er proclaims the development of friendly relations 
among nations, "based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" 
to be a purpose of the organization - other provi= 
sions of the Charter referring to this right being 
arts 55 and 76 - and a long sequence of United 
Nations resolutions endorsed the special import= 
ance attached by the international community to 
the principle of political independence. In its 
resolution 421 D (V) 1950 the General Assembly of 
the United Nations decided that the right of 
peoples and nations to self-determination was a 
fundamental human right, but in resolution 637 
(VII) 1952 the General Assembly went further and 
actually acknowledged the right of peoples and 
nations to self-determination as a prerequisite to 
the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights. 
The right of self-determination also finds expres= 
sion in the Declaration on the Granting of Indepen= 
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 1960 and 
in art 1 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1966 and of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966. The human rights covenants of 1966 was 
destined to become the Bill of Rights of the inter= 
national community of states, and it was decided 
by the General Assembly as early as 1952 - i e in 
GA Res 545 (VI) 1952 - to include an article in 
the covenants proclaiming the right of all peoples 
and nations to self-determination. It may, for 
the record, also be noted that the covenant on 
civil and political rights entered into force 
earlier this year (on January 4), while the coven= 
ant on economic, social and cultural rights became 
effective some time later (on March 23).
Seen as a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the right 
of self-determination of peoples and nations car= 
ries with it a weight of logical consequences, for 
instance that the mere lack of independence of the 
South West African peoples implies that human-
295
rights principles are being infringed in the ter= 
ritory, and also that the implementation of human- 
rights values will be futile as long as South 
Africa remains in effective control of South West 
Africa.
In the present context one ought also to be re= 
minded of GA Res 3103 (XXVIII) of 1973 which re= 
cognizes the use of armed force as a legitimate 
means for the liberation of peoples subjected to 
colonial or alien domination or to racist rêgimes. 
The preliminary observations of the Second Commis= 
sion accordingly recalls "the United Nations reso= 
lutions on the legitimacy of armed struggle and 
the political and material aid which States are 
invited to give it", and the Dakar Declaration 
reiterates that "all means, including armed strug= 
gle, are justified to liberate the country".
2.3 The Role of Swapo in South West Africa
The Dakar conference presupposed that Swapo is the 
sole authentic representative of the people of 
South West Africa. The Programme of Action there= 
fore calls for "maximum political and material 
support to Swapo", and the Dakar Declaration re= 
guests Governments that have not yet done so to 
recognize Swapo as such. Swapo1s claim that it is 
"the authentic representative of the Namibian 
people" had earlier been endorsed by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in paragraph I of 
its resolution 3295 (XXIX) of December 13, 1974, 
and the General Assembly at the same time promised 
support for Swapo's alleged efforts to "strengthen 
national unity".
This may be a convenient stage to make a few com= 
ments regarding Swapo.
I would first of all like to stress that not a 
single individual at the conference with whom I 
discussed Swapo's claim to be the only authentic 
representative of the people of South West Africa 
really believed that that is the case. Even the 
South Africans at the conference differed widely 
on the guestion as to the percentage support for 
Swapo in the territory. My own guess was that
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Swapo could, at the most, rely upon support from 
not more than 20% of the Black citizens of South 
West Africa, and I base my opinion on the excep= 
tionally high percentage poll in the Ovambo elec= 
tions of January 197 4 which was boicotted by 
Swapo. Swapo's blunt refusal to test its following 
in any future election conducted under South Afri= 
can control made its claim to majority support 
suspect, even though Swapo justified its attitude 
on the grounds that participation in elections 
conducted by South Africa would amount to an 
acknowledgement of South Africa's authority in the 
territory, which in turn would belie the supposed 
illegality of South Africa's claims to the territo= 
ry. A Swapo confidant (in a private discussion) 
also advanced the argument in support of Swapo's 
refusal to participate in elections conducted by 
South Africa in the territory that Swapo was not 
permitted by the South African authorities to can= 
vass freely. This argument led to an admission 
by the Swapo confidant that Swapo in actual fact 
does not presently enjoy majority support in the 
territory, but could munster majority support if 
it were permitted to indulge in unrestricted can= 
vassing under United Nations control.
I must also stress that Swapo was not prepared to 
commit itself to human-rights ideals and prin= 
ciples. It is true that a working paper dealing 
with principles to be enunciated in the constitu= 
tion of independent Namibia and which was alleged= 
ly drafted by Swapo proclaimed that such a consti= 
tution should contain a Bill of Rights which "will 
reflect the developing international standards of 
human rights". The same document also contains a 
supposed undertaking by Swapo to ratify the Inter= 
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 1966 and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 1966, to which refe= 
rence have been made earlier, but at the Confer= 
ence mr Sam Nujoma, the President of Swapo, ex= 
pressly stated that Swapo had in fact not decided 
to ratify the Covenants and will consider whether 
it ought to do so only after South West Africa 
will make its decision in this regard without any 
interference from outside.
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From what I have seen, heard and read I am person= 
ally convinced that Swapo has become a militant 
organization with definite Marxistic tendencies.
In his opening speech at the conference mr Nujoma 
said: "Since 1966, the strategic line which our 
liberation activity has been taking is character= 
ized by two major tactics, namely, continuous mass 
political mobilization and guerilla resistance". 
Swapo launched the armed struggle in the territory 
- to be exact - on August 26, 1966. In a working 
paper entitled "Namibia and the International Rule 
of Law" which is said to be a survey by Swapo, the 
author accordingly went to great lengths to prove 
"that a liberation war is not only morally but 
legally justified".
Swapo's Marxistic tendencies appeared from various 
other documents distributed to participants at the 
conference wherein Swapo proclaimed its intention, 
inter alia, to nationalize all industries and nat= 
ural resources in South West Africa and to abolish 
the Roman-Dutch law when it comes to power in the 
territory.
2 . 4 Apartheid in South West Africa
The fourth proposition adopted by the Dakar con= 
ference stated that South Africa is practising the 
policy of apartheid in South West Africa and that 
those practices constitute crimes against humanity. 
This proposition follows the line of reasoning of 
the many United Nations resolutions condemning 
racial discrimination and which culminated in the 
International Covenant on the Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid, 1973, which was proclaimed in 
GA Res 3068 (XXVIII) 1973. It was also relied 
upon by the Dakar conference as a further justifi= 
cation for armed intervention and/or liberation 
belligerency to bring South Africa's occupation of 
South West Africa to a speedy end.
The Dakar Declaration accordingly states that the 
system of apartheid is "a continuing threat to 
peace and security in southern Africa". It was 
also thought that South Africa's persistant refus= 
al to submit to the many United Nations resolutions
298
calling for the discontinuation of apartheid prac= 
tices justified the expulsion of South Africa from 
this world body in terms of art 6 of the UN Chart= 
er, which authorises such expulsions in cases of 
persistent violations of the principles contained 
in the Charter.
Specifically included in the South African policies 
that were denounced by the conference under this 
heading is the idea of bantustan homelands. In its 
preliminary observations the Second Commission 
referred to this aspect of the South African racial 
policy as an "attempt to divide the people of Na= 
mibia", the Dakar Declaration rejects the policy 
of "Bantustanization" as an "attempt to destroy 
the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia", 
and in the Programme of Action the Security Council 
of the United Nations is called upon to restrain 
"any attempts by South Africa to alter the borders 
of Namibia or to fragment or partition any portion 
of the Territory".
In passing I should like to point out that this is 
a rather surprising aspect of United Nations polic= 
ies. One of the major crimes of colonialism was 
the shattering of natural and national borders in 
Africa, thereby dividing ethnic and cultural en= 
titles and grouping peoples with quite different 
cultural-historical extractions into single nation= 
al entities. Somehow the United Nations came to 
regard such artificial and arbitrary colonial bor= 
derd as sacred, and its resolute determination to 
maintain those borders are evidenced by the sad 
history of, inter alia, Katanga and Biafra. One 
must therefore recognise that there is more to the 
United Nations opposition to the South African 
bantustan policy than mere stubborn anti-South 
Africanism. It concerns a persistent belief that 
existing borders ought to be respected and that 
political entities ought not to be devided into 
smaller states.
2.5 South Africa'8 Involvement in Angola
A further proposition subscribed to by the Dakar 
conference would have it that South Africa's mili= 
tary involvement in Angola constituted a threat to
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international peace and security. This being the 
case, sanctions to be imposed by the Security Coun= 
cil of the United Nations in pursuance of chapter 
VII of the UN Charter were called for. A decision 
by the Security Council taken under chapter VII of 
the Charter would mean that member states of the 
United Nations would be compelled to give effect 
to the Security Council's decision.
The sanctions mentioned in the Programme of Action 
include a complete embargo on the sale or transfer 
of arms and all other forms of military equipment 
to South Africa, the suspension by member states 
of financial relations with South Africa, and a 
check upon facilities provided by member states to 
South Africa which would enable it to undertake 
the production of uranium, plutonium and other 
nuclear materials or reactors.
I have recently stated in Johannesburg that South 
Africa's Angola escapade would in all probability 
be proved to have been the greatest blunder of 
this century. I made this statement in view of 
the fact that South Africa decided to indulge upon 
its Angolan campaign at a time when a Security- 
Council meeting had actually been scheduled for 
the purpose of deciding whether or not South Afri= 
ca's activities in South West Africa did in fact 
constitute a threat to international peace so as 
to merit the imposition by the Security Council of 
obligatory sanctions.*)
Needless to say, that the implementation of sanc= 
tions against South Africa could cause the country 
irrepearable harm and could, for that matter, also 
affect nabouring countries, such as Lesotho, whose 
economy is closely associated to South African 
economic institutions. In the past South Africa 
succeeded in avoiding enforceable sanctions, but 
it is obvious that South Africa had never before 
given so much scope for a positive finding by the 
Security Council that its activities in South West 
Africa constituted a threat to international peace, 
which in terms of the UN Charter would justify the 
imposition of compulsory sanctions against South 
Africa. South Africa actually participated in 
belligerency outside its own borders and that
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could easily have been taken to spell out interna= 
tional warfare.
We know now that the Security Council in fact once 
again refrained from taking action against South 
Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. My 
own guess is that this mere fact lends considerable 
support to speculations that South Africa entered 
Angola with at least the moral support, but more 
probably at the instigation, of certain Black 
African countries and possibly also of some Western 
power. It is also commonly believed in South 
Africa that the South African government's reluc= 
tance to disclose what actually occured before and 
during the Angolan campaign is in all probability 
due to an honourable desire not to embarrass those 
associates who caused or approved the use of South 
African troops against MPLA forces.
2.6 Diverse Other Decisions
The Dakar conference was particularly set on 
making certain other actions of the South African 
government in South West Africa suspect. This 
applies in particular to the constitutional talks 
in Windhoek on the future of the territory. Mr 
Sam Nujoma referred to the Black and Brown parti= 
cipant of the constitutional conference as 
"government stooges". The Dakar Declaration 
denounces and condemns the "so-called constitu= 
tional conference convened by South Africa, the 
composition and purpose of which have geen ille= 
gaily determined by the South African government". 
In its stead free elections under the supervision 
and control of the United Nations are called for.
As far as elections in South West Africa under 
United Nations supervision are concerned, I should 
like to draw attention to a proposal advanced at 
the conference by prof John Dugard of the Univer= 
sity of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. Real* 
ising that South Africa will in all probability 
not accept United Nations supervision and that 
Black African countries will likewise reject South 
West African elections conducted under supervision 
of any of the major western super-powers, prof 
Dugard suggested that it could prove to be
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acceptable to all parties concerned if the inter= 
national community of states would subscribe to 
elections in South West Africa being held under 
supervision of one or more of South Africa's 
détente associates in Africa. This proposal is in 
my opinion worthy of serious consideration.
On the other hand South Africa's détente efforts 
also came under fire in Dakar. The Dakar Declara= 
tion refers to the détente policy as "a snare" and 
one which is "aimed at causing confusion in inter= 
national public opinion as well as at undermining 
African unity".
South Africa's attempts to stimulate the economic 
development of South West Africa was seen as 
instances of economic exploitation. In its pre= 
liminary observations the Second Commission men= 
tioned "the looting of the country's natural 
resources" by South Africa. In this respect great 
emphasis was laid on what has become known as 
Decree no 1 of the United Nations Council for 
Namibia. This Council was established and entrust= 
ed with the administration of South West Africa in 
1967 by virtue of GA Res 2248 (S-V). Decree no 1 
was adopted by the Council on 27 September 1974 
and was approved by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 13 December of the same year.
(Cf GA Res 2678 (XXV) 1974). It represents the 
first legislative act of the Council for Namibia 
and is aimed at protecting the natural resources 
of South West Africa against exploiration by South 
Africa and western companies with economic inter= 
est in the territory. The Decree, broadly speak= 
ing, prohibits prospecting and mining activities 
in South West Africa without permission of the 
United Nations. Provision is made for the seizure 
and forfeiture of animal, mineral or other natural 
resources taken from the territory, and also of 
vehicles, ships or containers used for carrying 
such resources without the necessary permission.
At the conference special attention was given to 
ways and means for the effective implementation of 
the Decree - as was stated in the Declaration of 
Dakar - in order to "protect the natural resources 
of the people of Namibia and to ensure that these
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natural resources are not exploited to the detrim 
ent of Namibia, its people or environmental 
assets". The Programme of Action calls upon mem= 
ber states of the United Nations to enforce the 
Decree, in te r  a lia , by prohibiting through their 
domestic laws the import, without the authoriza= 
tion of the United Nations Commissioner for Nami= 
bia, of goods emanating from South West Africa.
3. The future o f  South West Africa
At a recent conference on the political future of 
South West Africa held in Windhoek, I outlined 
what I thought to be the requirements to be comp= 
lied with by South West Africa if it is to be 
acceptable as an independent state by the interna= 
tional community and in accordance with basic 
principles insisted upon by the United Nations 
Organization. Broadly speaking those requirements 
amount to the following principles:
3.1 Firstly South West Africa will have to sub= 
scribe to the principle of equality which, 
like the right to self-determination of peo= 
pies, has been proclaimed by the United 
Nations as an essential prerequisite for the 
effective protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The United Nation's 
consistent and persistent rejection of all 
instances of, inter alia, racial segregation 
and discrimination leaves no doubt that equal 
rights and privileges for all citizens of the 
territory - White, Brown and Black - will in= 
evitably be insisted upon by the world orga= 
nization.
3.2 The principle of equality also underlies the 
political doctrine of one man one vote. If 
there is one lesson to be learnt from the 
Rhodesian history of the past decade then it 
is the fact that anything less than total 
equality at the polls, irrespective of race 
and without any franchise qualifications 
whatsoever, is completely unacceptable to the 
international community of states. What I 
am, therefore, suggesting is that majority
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rule, and in particular black domination, in 
South West Africa is a sine qua non for inter= 
national recognition of South West Africa as 
an independent state.
3.3 It would finally be in line with modern poli= 
tical notions for the future government of 
South West Africa to safeguard certain basic 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in a 
constitutional Bill of Rights. The.Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 and the 
1966 human-rights covenents are indicative of 
the nature and contents of the rights and 
freedoms that ought to be included in such a 
Bill of Rights. Since South West Africa 
comprises a multi-national, multi-religious 
and multi-racial community the United Nations 
will in particular insist upon the constitu= 
tional protection of the rights and freedoms 
of minority groups.
I must, however, immediately emphasize that 
constitutional guarantees are not necessarily 
a waterproof safeguard of libertarean ideals. 
The history of decolonization in Africa has 
demonstrated most convincingly that constitu= 
tions can be nullified without seremony by 
the depositories of political power. The 
United Kingdom and France justly pride them= 
selves for having eguipped their former co= 
lonies with truly democratic and liberal 
constitutions, but very little of the dual 
party system, democratic elections and Bills 
of Right could survive the onslaught of the 
power-happy régimes of some Black political 
leaders. Nor need we glance beyond the Lim= 
popo to find proof of the futility of consti= 
tutional guarantees. South Africa's own 
constitutional scandal of the 1950's, which 
led to the enlargement of the Senate so as to 
secure a two-thirds majority in parliament 
for the purpose of circumventing the consti= 
tutional protection of the franchise rights 
of the coloured electorate, provides one of 
the most striking examples of violations of 
constitutional safeguards by state authority. 
This instance of circumventions of statutory
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guarantees is in fact so much the more deplor= 
able since the South African government ob= 
viated the constitutional entrenchment under 
the pretence of legitimacy.
One must therefore conclude that the White and 
Brown inhabitants of South West Africa will enjoy 
very little, if any, security if the territory 
were to achieve its independence in accordance 
with the requirements set by the international 
community and outlined by the relevant United- 
Nations resolutions.
J D van der Vyver 
PU for CHE
*) The editorial committee of Koers wants to state 
explicitly that it dissociates itself from the 
viewpoints expressed in this and the following 
two paragraphs and that it does so with the 
knowledge of the writer. EJS.
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